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Abstract
People are enjoying longer retirement periods, and population growth is slowing 
and, in some countries, falling. In this article, we determine the implications of 
these demographic changes for the needed amount of government debt. If tax 
rates and the transfer share of gross national income (GNI) are both high, the 
needed debt is near zero. With such a system, however, huge deadweight losses 
are incurred as a result of the high tax rate on labor income. With a savings 
system, a large government debt to annual GNI ratio is needed. In a country 
with early retirement and no population growth, the needed government debt 
is as large as ﬁ  ve times GNI, and welfare is as much as 24 percent higher in 
terms of lifetime consumption equivalents in the savings system relative to the 
tax-and-transfer system.
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We need to change our way of thinking regarding gov-
ernment debt. First, the government debt that a country 
owes to its citizens is not debt in the usual sense of the 
word. This form of government debt is a mechanism 
that facilitates intergenerational borrowing and lending, 
and is an integral part of a welfare-improving saving-
for-retirement system.
Second, because of changing demographics, the 
quantity of government debt needed in a saving-for-
retirement system is becoming large. The number of 
retired workers is growing because people are living 
longer and population growth has slowed in most of the 
advanced industrial countries. With these demograph-
ics, large government debt is a feature of the retirement 
ﬁnancing system that maximizes the lifetime welfare of 
all, including our grandchildren—namely, the saving-
for-retirement system. The alternative tax-and-transfer 
system, in which the government taxes workers’ labor 
income or consumption (or both) to ﬁnance the con-
sumption of retirees, has little or no government debt. 
However, the welfare for all, including our grandchil-
dren, is much lower in the tax-and-transfer system. 
Unlike the pure consumption loan model of Sam-
uelson (1958), taxing the income of people when young 
and making lump-sum transfers to them when old is not 
equivalent to there being large quantities of explicit gov-
ernment debt, which people buy during their working 
life and sell during their retirement life. Because people 
value their nonmarket time, taxing labor income or con-
sumption (or both) lowers labor supply. The welfare of 
a saving-for-retirement system is much higher than the 
welfare of a tax-and-transfer system. 
We begin with the Samuelson (1958) pure con-
sumption loan model and show that a pay-as-you-go 
retirement system and a savings system are equivalent. 
This follows from Ricardian equivalence, since the tax 
is lump-sum and there are no redistributions.1 In this 
world, people receive a large endowment of the con-
sumption good when young and a small endowment 
when old. They prefer smooth consumption over their 
lifetimes to consumption concentrated when young. 
Under the pay-as-you-go system, there is no government 
debt, whereas under the savings system, there is a large 
amount of government debt. We show that Ricardian 
equivalence holds and that someone born into either 
system enjoys the same level of welfare.
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  1An interesting but minor issue is associated with starting the savings system. 
This issue is addressed in Prescott and Ríos-Rull (2005), who develop an equilibrium 
concept for these environments with the property that the generation that sets up the 
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We then modify the economy in an important way. 
Rather than having the endowment when young be the 
consumption good, the endowment is productive time. 
This time can be used in the market to produce the con-
sumption good or can be used for valued nonmarket ac-
tivities. We label nonmarket activities as leisure because 
this is a conventional practice in macroeconomics even 
though some nonmarket activities are nonmarket work. 
As has been established, the time allocation decision 
between market and nonmarket activities responds to 
incentives. Consequently, a deadweight loss is associ-
ated with taxing labor income of young people to ﬁnance 
lump-sum transfers to the old.
Some naively think that government debt is a burden 
on the young. This is not the case, since the welfare of 
the young and government debt are both large in the 
efﬁcient saving-for-retirement system. Indeed, in the 
inferior tax-and-transfer system, government debt is 
zero. We go on to show that switching from a pay-as-
you-go system to a savings system beneﬁts everyone 
and incurs no costs. All that needs to be done to make 
the switch is to stop taxing labor income. During the 
transition period, transfers to the old would be ﬁnanced 
by a large deﬁcit and the stock of government debt would 
rise to its needed level. 
The economies discussed so far have no reproducible 
productive assets; that is, there is no capital. In fact, large 
quantities of reproducible productive assets are held 
by households, on the order of 3.5 times annual gross 
national income (GNI). We introduce production using 
both capital and labor, where labor is time allocated to 
market production. We calibrate this model economy to 
the behavior of the advanced industrial countries includ-
ing Australia, France, Japan, and the United States. This 
means that the model economies mimic the behavior of 
these actual economies on key aggregate dimensions 
given their policies. 
We ﬁnd that with a pure saving-for-retirement system, 
the ratio of government debt to annual GNI can be as 
high as 5 under plausible demographic assumptions. For 
the tax-and-transfer retirement system, the government 
owns the productive assets and there is no government 
debt. 
Currently, implicit government liabilities are large. 
In the United States, the Medicare and Social Security 
implicit liabilities are many times GNI. The Congres-
sional Budget Ofﬁce estimates these liabilities to be 
about four times GNI. Legally, these implicit liabilities 
are not government debt. They are called responsibilities 
by the U.S. Treasury and mandated expenditures by the 
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce.
We emphasize that ﬁnancing retirement is not a prob-
lem of insurance. Getting older each year is a predictable 
event. In the case of the United States, the survivor and 
disability insurance programs and the welfare system 
are insurance, not retirement, programs. Financing 
retirement and providing insurance are fundamentally 
different activities and are best kept separated. In the 
case of annuities, of course, there is insurance within 
a cohort against living too long, since annuities are 
insurance against outliving savings. Annuities are 
provided by the private sector, as are many other forms 
of insurance. Therefore, we abstract from uncertain 
lifetimes, which eliminates the need for annuities. All 
our conclusions hold with uncertain lifetimes provided 
there are annuities.
Three Examples
In this section, we use a few examples to compare the 
consequences of tax-and-transfer systems and saving-
for-retirement systems where the saving is in the form of 
government debt. First, we show that for a two-period-
lived, pure consumption loan model, both the tax-and-
transfer system and the saving-for-retirement system are 
preferable to autarky. Both systems maximize welfare 
but have starkly different levels of government debt. 
Second, we consider a three-period-lived consump-
tion loan model. In this model world, under the tax-and-
transfer system, there is no government debt, yet people 
are born with net liabilities to the government because 
the present value of taxes exceeds the present value of 
transfers. With the saving-for-retirement system, which 
has large government debt, people are born with no li-
ability to the government. 
In the third example, we include valued nonmarket 
time in the two-period-lived overlapping generations 
model. Here, a tax on labor income in the tax-and-
transfer system distorts the time allocation decision 
between market and nonmarket activities. As a result, 
the saving-for-retirement system with no labor income 
tax and large government debt is welfare improving. 
The lifetime welfare of a person being born into the 
saving-for-retirement system is 21 percent higher than 
in the tax-and-transfer system. The last example, in the 
subsection entitled “The Model with Capital Accumu-
lation,” adds capital accumulation to the model with 
valued nonmarket time. This example shows that the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
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existence of capital accumulation serves to reduce the 
amount of government debt needed to achieve a steady-
state allocation in a saving-for-retirement system.
The Pure Consumption Loan Model
People are endowed with 11 units of the consumption 
good when young and 1 unit when old. An equal number 
of people are born every period. A person born in period 
t has preferences ordered by
(1)  log log , , , c c t t 1 2 1 + +
where  c1 is consumption when young and  c2 is con-
sumption when old. The second subscript indicates when 
the consumption occurs.
The period t society resource constraint is 
(2)  c c t t 1 2 12 , , . + ≤
All variables are per person; therefore, c t 1,  is consump-
tion per young person at date t. 
With no government, c t 1 11 , =  and c t 2 1 , =  for all t. A 
feasible allocation that is much better for all is c t 1 6 , =  
and c t 2 6 , =  for all t. This can be supported as a com-
petitive equilibrium with either of two very different 
government policies. The ﬁrst has a government debt 
to output ratio of 5. The young buy this debt from the 
old and sell it when they are old. Given the nature of 
preferences, the equilibrium interest rate is zero, and so 
government interest rate payments are zero and there is 
no deﬁcit. If the endowment grew 50 percent per period,2 
the interest would be positive and there would be the 
need for a deﬁcit equal to one-quarter of total output. 
The deﬁcit pays for the interest on the government debt. 
Currently, the ratio of explicit U.S. government debt to 
annual GDP is 0.3. 
The second system taxes the endowment at rate 
� = 5 11 /  and transfers the proceeds in equal shares to 
the old. The equilibrium allocation is the same as in the 
savings system with government debt. This allocation 
maximizes utility per generation. Therefore, both sys-
tems maximize welfare in this sense but have starkly 
different amounts of government debt.
A Three-Period Consumption Loan Model
We deﬁne the debt facing a person entering the work-
force as the present value of taxes used to ﬁnance 
transfers minus the present value of transfers that the 
individual will receive. For this example, with the tax-
and-transfer system, new entrants to the workforce have 
debt, whereas in the saving-for-retirement system, new 
entrants are debt free. This fact may seem surprising 
given that there is no government debt in the tax-and-
transfer system, but there is a large quantity of govern-
ment debt in the saving-for-retirement system. But the 
tax-and-transfer system, not the saving system, imposes 
a debt burden on future generations for the following 
example.














+ + � �
,
where c1 is consumption when young, c2 is consump-
tion when middle-aged,  c3 is consumption when old, 
and the discount rate � is positive. The young and the 
middle-aged are endowed with 15 units of the consump-
tion good. The old receive no endowment. 
The ﬁrst government policy is to tax the young and 
middle-aged to provide for the old. This policy has no 
government debt. The young and middle-aged will be 
taxed at a rate of one-third of their endowment. The 
government transfers the revenue lump-sum to the old. 
The equilibrium for this policy is c c c 1 2 3 10 = = = . The 
interest rate is i = �, and there is no government debt. 
Under this tax-and-transfer system, each cohort has 
promises of transfers from the government when old. 
Each cohort must also pay taxes when young and when 
middle-aged. The present value of the taxes and transfers 
are speciﬁed in Table 1. Given that the interest rate is 
positive for this model economy, the present value of 
taxes exceeds the present value of beneﬁts. This means 
that the young are born with debt even though there is 
no government debt for this policy. The present value of 
transfers less the present value of taxes is the sum of the 
entries in the table. The important point, given that the 
interest rate is strictly positive, is that the sum is nega-
tive, which means that people are born with a liability 
to the government.
The equilibrium for the saving-for-retirement system 
has the same consumption allocation and interest rate. 
Government debt held by the old (before receiving inter-
est) is 10 1 /( ) +i . The pre-interest government debt held 
by middle-aged people is 5. Total government debt is 
  2Given that a period corresponds to 20 years, this growth rate is in line with 
the U.S. historical experience over the last 140 years (see McGrattan and Prescott 
2003). On the Needed Quantity of Government Debt
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therefore 10 1 5 /( ) + + i . Given that there are no taxes or 
transfers, people enter the labor force with no liability 
to the government.
Introducing Valued Nonmarket Time
When Samuelson wrote his classic paper in 1958, the 
Lucas and Rapping (1969) paper introducing labor supply 
into macroeconomics had not yet been written. We now 
introduce labor supply into the Samuelson pure consump-
tion loan model as follows. Rather than individuals being 
endowed with stocks of the consumption good, they are 
endowed with time, which they then allocate between 
market production and nonmarket activities:
(4)  log log , , , , , c c v l v l t t t t 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 + − − + +
where v1 and v2 are the disutility of labor supplied to the 
market parameters. Behind this utility is the Rogerson 
(1988) and Hansen (1985) labor indivisibility in the life-
cycle framework (see Prescott, Rogerson, and Wallenius 
2007 for endogenizing the indivisibility in a life-cycle 
setting). The values of the labor disutility parameters are 
v1 0 1 = .  and v2 1 = . There is great disutility of working 
when old, which is why people retire in this economy.
The technology is such that one unit of time produces 
one unit of the consumption good, which implies that 
the equilibrium wages are  w w t = =1 for all t. In this 
section we will consider only those policies for which 
consumption when young equals consumption when 
old. Given these preferences, the implication is that the 
equilibrium interest rate must be zero.
The budget constraint of a household born at date 
t is
(5)  c c wl wl b t t t t 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 , , , , ( ) ( ) , + = − + − + + + � �
where � is the tax rate on labor income, w is the wage 
rate, and b is the retirement beneﬁts paid by the govern-
ment. The government’s budget constraints are 
(6)  b l w t =� .
If there are no transfers and no government debt, the 
equilibrium values of consumption and labor supply 
are
(7)  c c 1 2 10 1 = = ;  ;    l l 1 2 10 1 = = ; .
This allocation can be improved upon. The following 
two systems are better for all.
The Tax-and-Transfer System
If transfers and taxes are such that consumptions of 
young and old are equal, the values of the policy param-
eters must be � = 0 5 .  and b = 5. The equilibrium values 
of the variables are l1 10 =  and l2 0 = , and c c 1 2 5 = = . 
This system has no government debt. It is better than no 
government, but it can be improved upon. 
The Government Debt System
Government debt is selected so that the consumptions 
of the young and the old are equated. The equilibrium 
allocation is l1 20 =  and c c 1 2 10 = = . Government debt 
is 10 and the interest rate is zero. The government debt 
to output ratio is 0.50.
The tax-and-transfer system has lower consump-
tion but more nonmarket time, which is valued by the 
household. The question remains: which system is bet-
ter—and by how much? To answer this question, we 
determine by what percentage the two consumptions 
must be increased to compensate individuals for being 
born into a world with a tax-and-transfer system rather 
than a saving-for-retirement system. The percentage 
by which consumptions in the tax-and-transfer system 
must be increased for individuals to be indifferent 
between being born into that world or one with the 
savings system is 21 percent. Thus, the deadweight 
loss of a tax-and-transfer system to ﬁnance retirement 
versus a saving-for-retirement system is 21 percent in 
lifetime consumption equivalents.
This establishes that the government debt is not a bur-
den per se on the young, because a young person would 
prefer to be born into a world with high government debt 
rather than one with no government debt. 
Table 1
Present Value of Taxes and Transfers 
in the Tax-and-Transfer System
When Cohort Is         Present Value of Tax or Transfers
Old                                  10/(1+i )2
Middle-aged                        –5/(1+i )
Young                                    –5FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
QR
6
The Model with Capital Accumulation
The economies considered so far have no reproducible 
productive assets, namely, capital. Saving in the form 
of reproducible productive assets reduces the amount 
of government debt needed to support the steady-state 
allocation that maximizes the utility of people.3 We show 
this result in this section.
We modify the economy to have durable capital 
goods that enhance production possibilities. The produc-
tion function is Cobb-Douglas with
(8)  C X AK L t t t t + ≤ 1 3 2 3 / / .
The capital letters denote aggregate variables, with 
C denoting consumption, X denoting investment, K 
denoting both capital services and capital stock (one 
unit of capital stock produces one unit of capital ser-
vices), and L denoting labor services. The choice of 
this Cobb-Douglas production function was dictated 
by the constancy of capital income share near 1/3 over 
time and across countries. The capital depreciation rate 
is 100 percent, so
(9)  K X t t + = 1 .
Given that a period is 25 years, this depreciation rate 
is reasonable.
The capital-output ratio, 1/3, is large in this economy. 
Given that a period is 25 years, the annualized capital 
income ratio is 25 times larger, or 8.33, which is almost 
twice the ratio for economies throughout the world. In 
the next two sections, we use a calibrated model to draw 
quantitative inferences as to the welfare consequences 
of different policies, where the capital-output ratio is 
in line with the real world. But this example sufﬁces to 
make the point that less government debt is needed in 
the pure savings system if there is capital accumulation. 
We make the convenient normalization  A = − ( / ) / 2 3 2 3 
and assume  v
1 1 3 = / . The disutility of working when 
old, v2, is large enough that the old do not work, so an 
equilibrium relation is l2 0 = .
The equilibrium allocation is c c X K 1 2 1 = = = =  and 
l1 3 = . Aggregate output is 3 and capital income share 
is 1 3 / . Thus, the amount of government debt is zero. 
This is because the labor income of the young is 2, their 
consumption 1, and consequently their savings 1. Since 
investment is 1, the amount of government debt needed 
to support this allocation is zero. For this numerical 
example, savings in the form of capital eliminates the 
need for any government debt.
The examples in this section establish the need to 
use economic theory and measurement to examine the 
consequences of different debt, transfer, and tax policies 
to determine the amount of needed government debt 
relative to gross national income. We now use both 
theory and measurement to draw some inferences as to 
the needed amount of government debt.
Model Economy Used for Policy Evaluation 
This section develops a model that we use to predict the 
consequences of two retirement policies under alterna-
tive demographic assumptions. In both cases, we ﬁnd the 
balanced growth path with the property that the return on 
capital is 5 percent before taxes. This balanced growth 
path determines the size of transfers and government 
debt given the tax rates on labor and capital income. 
No equilibrium exists with the dynamic inefﬁciency 
of Diamond (1965) if borrowing and lending contracts 
are permitted by inﬁnitely lived organizational entities. 
There will be an equilibrium for our policies because 
the policy-pegged interest rate exceeds the growth rate 
of the economy. Abel et al. (1989) empirically show that 
there is no dynamic inefﬁciency in the case of the United 
States. The interest rates and growth rates have been 
preset in a way that is consistent with the full equilibrium 
but which enables a simple balanced growth analysis. 
In the section entitled “Policy Evaluations Under Vari-
ous Demographic Assumptions,” we use the model to 
evaluate retirement policies under different demographic 
assumptions. 
This model includes capital accumulation and extends 
the lifetime of each agent to N years, with the ﬁrst Nw 
years being the working life and the last Nr years being 
the retirement life.4 The inputs to production are capital 
services and labor services, as in the subsection entitled 
“The Model with Capital Accumulation.” The assets that 
people hold are capital and government debt. 
The Model Economy
Fiscal Structure
The ﬁscal policy parameters are  ( , ,{ , } ), � � � h k t t t D =
∞
0
where �h is the tax rate on labor income, �k is the tax 
  3Introducing a nonreproducible productive asset, such as land, would not alter 
this conclusion. There would not be a need for government debt to achieve the al-
location that is efﬁcient with the savings system.
  4In this model, we take the retirement age as given. See the work of Rogerson 
and Wallenius (2007) for endogenizing the retirement decision. On the Needed Quantity of Government Debt
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rate on capital income net of depreciation, and { , } Dt t �  
is the paths of government debt { } Dt  and transfers to 
all people { } �t . 
The capital tax is paid by the owner of capital, the 
stand-in bank. The labor income tax is paid by the 
workers. The transfers are made lump-sum each period 
to all people in the economy in the same amount. Hav-
ing a transfer to only retired agents would change the 
accounting in the economy, but not the equilibrium al-
location. People save for retirement by holding assets 
at the stand-in bank, which owns the capital stock and 
any government debt. 
People
A cohort is born every year with cohort size grow-
ing at rate �. We normalize the measure of the initial 
population to 100. The consumption of those younger 
than working age is implicitly included in their parents’ 
consumption. People begin working at age 20 and are 
endowed with one unit of time each period of their work-
ing life, which is  Nw years, and then have a retirement 
life, which is Nr years. Their lifetime is N + 20 years, 
where N N N w r = + . In each year of their working life, 
people divide their time endowment between market 
work and leisure. 
The lifetime utility of a person that enters the work-
force in period t =1 is






− + − ∑
1
1
1 1 [( )log log( )]
    + − + −






1 1 [( )log log( )]
People value consumption and leisure in each period. 
Since each person is endowed with one unit of time each 
period, the amount of leisure is simply ( ), 1− ht  where ht  
is the time allocated to the market. Retired people allocate 
no time to the market. The parameter � is the leisure 
share parameter. The parameter � ≤1 is the rate at which 
people discount future utility. The ﬁrst part of the utility 
function is the utility during the working lifetime, and the 
second part is the utility during retirement. Macroeco-
nomic observations dictate this choice of utility function 
for the intertemporal leisure elasticity of substitution. 
These observations include business cycle facts, pros-
perities and depressions, and labor supply differences 
across the major advanced industrial countries.5
The lifetime budget constraint of an individual enter-
































The present value of cash ﬂows is zero.
Each year a worker chooses how much time to al-
locate to the market, how much to consume, and how 
much to save. Retired workers do not work and have no 
labor supply decision, just a consumption decision. 
Deﬁne the agents that enter the workforce in period 1 
as cohort 1. The period budget constraints for the cohort 
1 person are 
(12)  a a i w h c t t t h t t t t + − = + + − + − 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) , � �
where  at  is beginning of period t assets. Initial assets 
of cohort 1 are  a1 0 = . The individual’s allocation of 
assets between tangible capital and government debt is 
not determined. The sum, however, is determined, as is 
the aggregate holdings of these two assets. At the begin-
ning of the period, interest is paid on the level of assets 
held at the end of last period. This interest rate, it−1, is 
determined in period t −1 and paid in period t. The tax 
rate on labor income is �h, and the consumers’ after-tax 
labor income in period t is ( ) . 1−�h t t w h  
Stand-In Bank
To handle the indeterminacy of individual portfolio 
composition, we introduce a stand-in bank. This bank 
has liabilities to individuals in the form of deposits or 
assets, At, and owns both the capital stock,  Kt, and 
the government debt, Dt. Therefore,  A K D t t t = + . The 
bank rents the capital stock to the stand-in ﬁrm for use 
in production at the rate of rt. After production, the ﬁrm 
returns the capital to the bank less depreciation. The 
bank chooses how much to invest in capital stock, pays 
interest to depositors, and pays any tax on net capital 
income.
The capital stock owned by the bank evolves ac-
cording to 
  5See Prescott 2006.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
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(13)  K K X t t t + = − + 1 1 ( ) , �  
where  Xt  denotes investment and  0 1 < < � is the de-
preciation rate. The technology of the stand-in bank 
displays constant returns to scale so proﬁts are zero, 
and we need not worry about ownership of the bank. 
Therefore, the interest rate paid on assets is exactly equal 
to the after-tax net income from renting the capital. This 
means that
(14)  i r t k t − = − − 1 1 ( )( ) � �  
must be satisﬁed, where rt  is the year t rental price of 
capital and �k  is the tax rate on net capital income.
Stand-In Firm
The ﬁrm rents capital services from the bank and labor 
services from the households for use in producing output 
that can be used for consumption or investment. The 
production function of the stand-in ﬁrm is 
(15)  Y K Z H t t t t = − � � ( ) . 1
The parameter  Zt grows at rate �, and the parameter 
�  is the capital share parameter. The equilibrium wage 
rate is equal to the marginal product of labor, and the 
rental rate of capital is equal to the marginal product of 
capital. The production technology of the stand-in ﬁrm 
displays constant returns to scale; therefore, we need 
not worry about the ownership of the ﬁrm.
Government
The government in the model economy receives revenue 
from a tax on labor income and net capital income: 
(16)  Revenuet k t t h t t r K w H = − + � � � ( )
The government spends this revenue on a lump-sum 
transfer to all individuals and interest payments on 
government debt. Let  Ψt t N = �  denote aggregate 
transfers. The law of motion for the amount of govern-
ment debt is
(17)  D i D t t t t t + − = + − 1 1 Ψ Revenue .
Fiscal policy is such that the steady-state after-tax 
interest rate, i, is 4 percent. Within this model economy, 
we consider two policies for ﬁnancing retirement. The 
ﬁrst is a pay-as-you-go tax-and-transfer system with a 
tax on labor income and net capital income. With this 
restriction and the two tax rates, the paths of government 
debt and aggregate transfers are determined. The second 
policy is a savings policy for which the government does 
not tax the labor income of the workers. For the case in 
which the government debt is negative, the government 
has an interest-bearing deposit at the stand-in bank. 
Any public consumption is treated as a transfer in kind 
to households.
Aggregates
Output is used only for consumption by individuals and 
investment by the bank. Therefore, Y C X t t t = + . Aggre-
gate consumption at date t is the sum of the consumption 
of all individuals alive at time t,







= − ∑ ,
where the superscript b denotes the cohort, or year of 
birth, and Nb is the size of cohort b. Aggregate assets, At, 
are determined in the same way. In the case of aggregate 
hours, Ht, the summation begins at b t Nw = − .
Model Parameter Values 
We consider balanced growth or steady-state equilibria. 
For such equilibria, ( , , , , , ) Y K C X A D t t t t t t  grow at rate 
g, ( , , , , ) Z w c a t t t t t �  grow at rate �,( , , ) H N N t t
b  grow at 
rate �, and ( , , ) h r i t t t  are constant. Along the balanced 
growth path, the government holds assets or issues debt 
in order to keep the interest rate ﬁxed at i.
Before we can derive any quantitative policy impli-
cations using the model, we must calibrate the model. 
We calibrate this model economy to the behavior of the 
advanced industrialized countries. This means that the 
model economy mimics the behavior of these actual 
economies on a number of key aggregate dimensions. 
We need to calibrate six parameters:  ( , , , , , ). � � � � � Z
The ﬁrst four are technology parameters, and the last two 
are preference parameters. In the calibration we need 
values for the three demographic parameters ( , , ) N N w r �  
and the two tax rates ( , ). � � h n  The demographic param-
eters and tax rates will vary across examples.
We use U.S. data to tie down the parameters. We nor-
malize the value of aggregate output to one. We use data 
on the U.S. economy, where the marginal effective tax 
rate on labor income is 0.40.6 We set �k = 0 20 . .The tax 
  6See Prescott 2002.On the Needed Quantity of Government Debt
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rate on corporate capital is higher than this, but the tax 
rates on other capital including owner-occupied housing 
and consumer durables are lower than this ﬁgure. We 
include depreciation on consumer durables in deprecia-
tion and impute services to consumer durables in much 
the same way that national accounts impute services to 
owner-occupied housing. This inclusion increases the 
capital cost share parameter. 
The preference and technology parameters ( , , , ) � � � �  
can be calibrated using the following observations: (i) 
the growth rate of output is 2 percent per year; (ii) the 
annual capital to output ratio is 3.5; (iii) the capital cost 
share is 0.35; (iv) the depreciation of the capital stock 
relative to output is 0.175; and (v) the before-tax return 
on capital is 5 percent. With the tax rate on net capital 
income of 20 percent, the after-tax return on capital and 
the household interest rate are both 4 percent. 
In order to calibrate the preference parameter  and 
the technology parameter Z, we need to use the demo-
graphic parameters, the normalization of the initial 
population to 100, and the observation that the fraction 
of productive time of working-age people allocated to 
the market given the tax rate of labor of 40 percent is 
0.25. The demographic parameters are calibrated us-
ing observations from the United States. The average 
working life is 45 years. The average adult lifetime is 
85 years. So, people are retired for 20 years. Finally, the 
population growth rate is 1 percent per year. 
We will deal only with policies that result in the after-
tax return on capital being 4 percent because this has 
been the after-tax return on noncorporate capital in the 
United States since 1929, the ﬁrst year for which national 
income and product accounts data for the United States 
exist. This is the approximate return realized by house-
holds prior to 1929 on important savings instruments. 
For more details, see McGrattan and Prescott 2003. 
The motivation for the selection of a 2 percent growth 
rate of output is that this has been the trend growth 
rate in the United States over the last 135 years. The 
accounts for the model economy are reported in Table 
2. The calibrated parameters are listed in Table 3. The 
Appendix explains the algorithm for solving for the 
balanced growth path of the economy.
Demographic Assumptions
The two main demographic assumptions that inﬂuence 
the optimal amount of government debt are the length 
of the retirement period and the population growth rate. 
Holding an individual’s working life ﬁxed, a longer re-
tirement period increases the amount of assets a person 
of a given age holds. We explore various demographic 
assumptions. Population growth rates are now low and 
even negative in some advanced industrial countries. As 
asset positions differ with age, changing the age distribu-
tion will have consequences for the needed amount of 
government debt.
Policy Evaluations Under 
Various Demographic Assumptions 
When comparing alternate retirement policies, we focus 
on the welfare criterion of lifetime consumption equiva-
lents of someone entering the workforce. We emphasize 
that ours is a steady-state analysis. We examine the level 
of government debt needed for each of the retirement 
policies in our calibrated model. 
We consider four demographic examples. First 
we consider an economy with 1 percent population 
growth, a retirement age of 65, and a retirement period 
of 20 years. This ﬁrst economy has roughly the same 
demographics as the current U.S. economy. Second, 
we consider an economy that might look like the future 
U.S. economy with no population growth, a retirement 
age of 65, and a retirement period of 30 years. Third, 
Table 2
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we look at an economy with no population growth, a 
retirement age of 65, and a retirement period of 20 years. 
These demographics are similar to the current Japanese 
economy. Last, we consider an economy with no popu-
lation growth, a retirement age of 60, and a retirement 
period of 25 years. These demographics are similar to 
the current French economy.
The two main ﬁndings that emerge from the policy 
evaluations are that the optimal amount of government 
debt depends on the demographics of the economy and 
that the move from a tax-and-transfer retirement policy 
to a saving-for-retirement policy is welfare improving. A 
summary of the results is presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
Current United States 
The ﬁrst case we examine roughly captures the current 
U.S. economy. This is the benchmark case we used for 
calibration. The population growth rate is 1 percent per 
year, and the growth rate of technology is 2 percent 
per year. The retirement age is 65, and the retirement 
period is 20 years. The actual retirement policy in the 
U.S. economy is somewhere between a full tax-and-
transfer system and a complete saving-for-retirement 
system. Here we simply compare a system with the U.S. 
marginal effective tax rate on labor income with a full 
saving-for-retirement system. 
In the tax-and-transfer system, labor income is taxed 
at 40 percent, and net capital income is taxed at 20 per-
cent. The equilibrium government debt to output ratio 
in the model economy is zero. The government capital 
to output ratio is 0.62. This means the government owns 
18 percent of the productive assets in the economy, 
which is about double the U.S. government’s holdings 
of capital.7 
If the government policy changed such that the only 
tax levied was on net capital income, the ratio of govern-
ment debt to output would rise to 1.30 and government 
holding of capital would be zero. In addition, aggregate 
output would increase from 1.00 to 1.43. Because of the 
increase in the after-tax wage faced by the worker, labor 
allocated to the market increases. In the tax-and-transfer 
system, a person entering the workforce today allocates 
25 percent of his time endowment to the market. In the 
savings system, a worker allocates 36 percent of his 
time to the market. However, the reduction in leisure is 
more than offset by increases in consumption with the 
savings system. The lifetime and cross-sectional asset 
holdings are plotted in Figures 1 and 2.
In order to evaluate these two policies, we consider 
the welfare of a person entering the workforce today. 
By entering the economy with the savings system, his 
welfare is 9.2 percent higher in terms of lifetime con-
sumption equivalents. This means that in order for him 
to be indifferent between the tax-and-transfer system and 
the saving-for-retirement system, his consumption in the 
tax-and-transfer economy would need to be increased 
by 9.2 percent in every period of his life. To summarize, 
the economy with the saving-for-retirement system has 
a signiﬁcantly larger government debt to gross national 
product (GNP) ratio, but it provides higher welfare for 
an agent entering the workforce. 
Future United States
Next, we examine a possible future United States 
economy. This economy has zero population growth, 
and people have a longer retirement period of 30 years. 
This economy has a tax-and-transfer system with a tax 
rate on labor income of 40 percent and net capital income 
of 20 percent. Aggregate output is 0.907, and the govern-
ment debt to output ratio is 1.7. Individuals allocate 28 
percent of their time endowment to the market. 
  7Based on information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Con-
gressional Budget Ofﬁce, the U.S. government’s holding of capital net of current 
government debt is approximately 7 percent of the aggregate U.S. capital stock.
Table 3
Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameters    Values
 0.0200 Average growth in per capita consumption
 0.3500 Capital cost share
   0.0500 Depreciation and capital stock
Z 0.0269 Y normalized to 1 in base year
          0.6822 Leisure share parameter in the utility function
          0.9808 Fact that consumption of each individual 
grows by factor (1+) 
Nw                   45 Working lifetime
N 65 Working lifetime plus retirement period
          0.01 Population growth rate
Population 100On the Needed Quantity of Government Debt
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If the retirement policy changed to a saving-for-retire-
ment system, there are no transfers from the government. 
The labor income tax is 7.5 percent, since tax revenues 
are needed to help ﬁnance the interest on the government 
debt. With a switch to this policy, aggregate output would 
increase to 1.21, and the government debt to output ratio 
would increase to 4.5. Individuals would now allocate 38 
percent of their time endowment to the market. 
Aggregate output increases but market work also 
increases, so what is the effect on the welfare of a person 
entering the workforce? In terms of lifetime consump-
tion equivalents, the welfare of a person entering the 
workforce is 5.5 percent higher in the economy with a 
saving-for-retirement system than in the economy with 
a tax-and-transfer system. 
Current Japan 
The third example is motivated by the current Japanese 
economy. The growth rate of the population is zero. 
The growth rate of technology is 2 percent per year, 
the retirement age is 65, and the retirement period is 20 
years. The tax-and-transfer system taxes labor income 
Table 4
Policy Evaluations Under Various Demographic Assumptions 
(Current and Future U.S.)
Current U.S. Future U.S.
= 0.01, retire at 65, die at 85          =0.00, retire at 65, die at 95
Tax-and-Transfer      Savings              Tax-and-Transfer      Savings
Output 1.000 1.429 0.907            1.210
Government (relative to output)
Receipts
Tax revenue 0.295 0.035 0.295            0.084
Interest received 0.031 0.000 0.000           0.000
Expenditures
Transfers 0.301 0.022 0.261     –0.006
Interest paid 0.000 0.052 0.068     0.180
Deficit –0.025 0.039 0.034     0.090
Household balance sheet (relative to output)
Total assets 2.877 4.795 5.191     8.003
Total capital 2.877 3.500 3.500     3.500
Total government debt  0.000 1.295 1.691     4.503
Government balance sheet (relative to output)
Total capital 0.623 0.000     0.000            0.000
Total debt outstanding  0.000 1.295 1.691            4.503
Individual consumption 0.00719 0.01027 0.00684         0.00914
Transfer/consumption 0.418 0.031 0.346          –0.008
Individual labor supply         0.250 0.357 0.286            0.382
Labor income tax rate 0.400 0.000 0.400            0.075
Welfare gain  9.18% 5.51%
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at 40 percent and net capital income at 20 percent. The 
government debt to output ratio is 0.0, and the govern-
ment capital to output ratio is 0.11. The government 
owns 3 percent of the capital stock. Aggregate output is 
0.943, and individuals allocate 26 percent of their time 
endowment to the market.
In an economy with a saving-for-retirement system, 
there is no tax on labor income. The government debt 
to output ratio in this economy is 2.15. Aggregate out-
put increases to 1.34, and time allocated to the market 
increases to 36.7 percent. In terms of lifetime consump-
tion equivalents, the welfare of a person entering the 
workforce is 7.8 percent higher in the economy with the 
saving-for-retirement system than in the economy with a 
tax-and-transfer system. This means that a person’s con-
sumption in the tax-and-transfer economy would need to 
be increased by 7.8 percent in every period in order for 
him to be indifferent between entering the workforce in 
the two economies. So the move from a tax-and-transfer 
system to a saving-for-retirement system increases the 
welfare of a person entering the workforce and increases 
the government debt to output ratio.
Table 5
Policy Evaluations Under Various Demographic Assumptions 
(Current Japan and France)
Current Japan Current France
= 0.00, retire at 65, die at 85          =0.00, retire at 60, die at 85
Tax-and-Transfer      Savings              Tax-and-Transfer      Savings
Output 0.943 1.340 0.672            1.242
Government (relative to output)
Receipts
Tax revenue 0.295 0.035 0.425          0.068
Interest received 0.006 0.000 0.029           0.000
Expenditures
Transfers 0.297 –0.008 0.437     –0.001
Interest paid 0.000 0.086 0.000     0.137
Deficit –0.004 0.043 – 0.017     0.068
Household balance sheet (relative to output)
Total assets 3.390 5.650 2.914     6.920
Total capital 3.390 3.500 2.914     3.500
Total government debt  0.000 2.150 0.000     3.420
Government balance sheet (relative to output)
Total capital 0.110 0.000     0.586            0.000
Total debt outstanding  0.000 2.150 0.000            3.420
Individual consumption 0.00711 0.01012 0.00507         0.00938
Transfer/consumption 0.394 – 0.011 0.578          –0.001
Individual labor supply         0.258 0.367 0.207            0.382
Labor income tax rate 0.400 0.000 0.600            0.050
Welfare gain  7.83% 23.38%
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Current France 
The last economy we examine is motivated by the 
current French economy. This economy has zero popu-
lation growth, retirement at age 60, and a retirement 
period of 25 years. In the tax-and-transfer system, the 
tax rate on labor income is 60 percent, and the tax rate 
on net capital income is 20 percent. Aggregate output 
is 0.672, and the government has no debt. The govern-
ment capital to output ratio is 0.59, which means the 
government owns 11 percent of the productive assets 
in the economy. 
With a saving-for-retirement system, the govern-
ment levies a 5 percent labor income tax and a 20 
percent tax on net capital income. As a result, output 
nearly doubles to 1.24, and the government debt to 
output ratio increases to 3.42. Workers’ time allocated 
to the market increases from 0.21 to 0.38. This system 
signiﬁcantly reduces the deadweight loss due to the la-
bor income tax. As a result, the welfare gain of switch-
ing from the tax-and-transfer system to the savings 
system is 23 percent in terms of lifetime consumption 
equivalents. For economies with high labor income 
tax rates and long retirement periods, the switch from 
a tax-and-transfer system to a saving-for-retirement 
system generates a large welfare gain and needs a siz-
able amount of government debt. 
Deﬁcit Implications
As shown in Tables 4 and 5, a saving-for-retirement 
system has a larger budget deﬁcit than a tax-and-
transfer system for all four examples. The large deﬁcit 
means government debt increases, but it does not in-
crease relative to output. Along the balanced growth 
path, the budget deﬁcit to output ratio remains con-
stant, as does the government debt to output ratio. In 
a saving-for-retirement system, the government taxes 
net capital income and makes interest payments and 
small transfers. Table 4 shows that the current U.S. 
savings system generates capital tax revenue equal to 
3.5 percent of output. The government makes lump-
sum transfers back to the people equal to 2.2 percent 
of output. That leaves 1.3 percent of output for paying 
the interest on the government debt. The total inter-
est payments on this debt are equal to 5.2 percent of 
output. The deﬁcit each period stays constant at 3.9 
percent of output. 
The current U.S. system is neither all tax-and-trans-
fer nor all saving-for-retirement. There is a signiﬁcant 
amount of private saving for retirement. The current 
U.S. deﬁcit is approximately 2 percent of output. So 
moving to a welfare-improving saving-for-retire-
ment system would increase the government budget 
deﬁcit.
Lifetime Asset Profile
for Current U.S. Demographic
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With the welfare-improving saving-for-retirement sys-
tem, the needed amount of explicit government debt 
is large if the fraction of retirees is large. With a tax-
and-transfer system, government debt is small, but the 
present value of promised transfers is large. In addition, 
with such a system, huge deadweight losses are incurred 
as a result of the high tax rate on labor income. 
With the current demographics in the United States, 
moving from a tax-and-transfer system to a saving-for-
retirement system would increase the government debt 
to output ratio to 1.3 and would result in a welfare gain 
of more than 9 percent in terms of lifetime consumption 
equivalents. With plausible future demographics for the 
United States with no population growth and longer 
retirement periods, the government debt to output ratio 
would increase to 4.5. 
The gains of a switch to a saving-for-retirement sys-
tem are even larger in Western Europe, where effective 
labor income tax rates are signiﬁcantly higher than in 
the United States. The welfare gains are as large as 24 
percent in terms of lifetime consumption equivalents. 
Since the needed government debt is 3.4 times gross 
national income (GNI), this means that the Maastricht 
Treaty would have to be revised to permit more than 0.6 
times GNI of debt.
For all of the plausible demographic assumptions, 
moving from a tax-and-transfer system to a saving-
for-retirement system increases government debt and 
is welfare improving. Government debt is not a burden 
on our grandchildren. Our grandchildren will be better 
off in a world with a saving-for-retirement system and 
sizable government debt. 
Appendix 
The following speciﬁes the algorithm used to ﬁnd the equi-
librium of the model described in the subsection entitled 
“The Pure Consumption Loan Model.” We are looking for 
an equilibrium where ( , , , , , ) Y K C X A D t t t t t t  grow at rate g, 
( , , , , ) Z w c a t t t t t �  grow at rate �,( , , ) H N N t t
b  grow at rate �, 
and  ( , , ) h r i t t t  are constant. Along the balanced growth path, 
the government holds assets or issues debt in order to keep the 
interest rate ﬁxed at i. Given the parametric set of economies, 
we are looking for a balanced growth path of this economy 
given the interest rate, the tax rate on net capital income, and 
the labor income tax rate.
The ﬁrst step is to solve for the rental price of capital, r, 
using the capital tax rate and the depreciation rate along with 
the bank’s no proﬁt condition, i r k = − − ( )( ). 1 � �  The second 
step is to solve for the capital-labor ratio using the proﬁt-maxi-
mizing condition of the stand-in ﬁrm with respect to capital, 
r Y K =�( / ). Then solve for the capital-labor ratio using the 
production function,  ( / ) ( / ) . Y K Z H K = − 1 �  Next, solve for 
the real wage, w, using the stand-in ﬁrm’s other proﬁt-maxi-
mizing condition,  w Z K H = − ( ) ( / ) . 1 � �  The next step is to 
solve for per capita consumption, c, individual labor supplied, 
h, aggregate consumption, and aggregate labor supply. This 
step requires solving four equations in four unknowns. Given 
the interest rate and the calibrated values for  � and �, the 
intertemporal growth rate of consumption for an individual 
is equal to the growth rate of per capita consumption across 
cohorts. This means that even though the consumption of 25-
year-olds today is higher than that of 25-year-olds yesterday, 
the consumption this period is the same for all individuals.
    c i c 2
1
1
1 1 = + �( )   : intertemporal condition for 
        the household
    c c 2
2
1
1 1 = + ( ) �   : growth rate of per capita 
        consumption across cohorts
So when � � ( ) ( ) 1 1 + = + i , the consumption of each cohort is 
the same in period t, c c c 2
2
2
1 = = . The four equations in four 
unknowns are
    C N c i
i N
= +
=− ∑ ( ) 1 1
1
�   : the deﬁnition of 
        aggregate consumption
  
    H N h i
i Nw
= +
=− ∑ ( ) 1 1
1
�   : the deﬁnition of 
        aggregate labor supply
    C K ZK H + + = − ( ) � � � � 1   : the aggregate 
        resource constraintOn the Needed Quantity of Government Debt
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= −   : the household’s 
        intratemporal 
        marginal condition,
where  N1 is the size of cohort 1.
After solving for c and h, solve for  using the lifetime 
budget constraint of the household: 
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The next step is to solve for aggregate assets in the economy 




1 = ∑ = − .
First, calculate the lifetime asset proﬁle of an individual 
born in period 1 using a a i t t t + − = + + 1 1 1 ( )  ( ) 1− + − � � h t t t t wh c
and a1
1 0 = .
Since the economy is on the balanced growth path and 
we know the vector of { } at t
N 1
1 = , we can solve for the vector of 
{ } a b
b N 1
1
=−  using the following relationship:at
b − = ab
t b /( ) . 1+�
Therefore, the total assets in the economy in period 1: 
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The ﬁnal step solves for government debt, D. First, using the 
bank’s balance sheet condition,  A K D = +  and aggregate 
assets, ﬁnd D. A corresponding step involves looking at the 
government’s budget constraint. Solve for total tax revenue 
and total transfers as follows: 
    Revenue = − + � � � k h r K wH ( ) .
    Transfers, Ψ = +






Then ﬁnd government debt using the government’s budget 
constraint:
    Revenue = + − Ψ ( ) . i D �
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